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I. Introduction 
Economists and academic administrators have long been concerned with issues of 
faculty productivity.  For example, sets of studies have addressed whether faculty 
research productivity is related to faculty salaries (Hamermesh et. al. 1982, Hamermesh 
1988), whether gender differences in faculty salaries remain after one controls for 
research productivity (Ginther and Hayes 2003, Thilmany 2000), and whether a negative 
association between faculty salary and seniority at an institution is due to universities 
having monopsony power or due to declining faculty research productivity with seniority 
(Bratsberg, Ragan and Warren 2003, Moore, Newman and Turnbull, 1998).  
To take another example, concern that the ending of mandatory retirement, which 
became effective for tenured faculty in January 1994, would lead to an aging 
nonproductive faculty has led other researchers to examine how faculty research and 
teaching productivity, the latter measured by undergraduate student evaluations, have 
varied over the life cycle (Rees and Smith 1991, Levin and Stephan 1991).  More 
recently, researchers studied whether declining research productivity is related to the 
acceptance of an offer for an early retirement incentive (Kim 2002).  Finally, other 
researchers have looked at how faculty research productivity varies across cohorts, 
finding that when a scientist enters the labor market has a substantial effect on his or her 
productivity over the life cycle and that more recently educated cohorts are not 
necessarily more productive than earlier cohorts (Levin and Stephan, 1991, Stephan and 
Levin 1992). 
While some studies have looked at the implicit role that PhD student production has 
on the quality rankings of PhD programs (e.g. Ehrenberg and Hurst 1998), to our 
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knowledge no studies have focused on how the distribution of PhD student supervisory 
responsibilities varies across faculty members at a university.  Our study uses data on all 
PhDs produced during a 7-year period at Cornell University to illustrate how researchers 
can study whether the degree of inequality in PhD student supervision across faculty 
members within a broad field of study, varies across fields, as well as what the 
determinants are of differences in PhD student supervision responsibilities across 
individual faculty members within each broad field.  Of particular concern to us, given 
the elimination of mandatory retirement, is how faculty members’ productivity in the 
supervision of PhD students varies over their life cycles. 
II. Background Data 
Each doctoral student at Cornell chooses a special faculty committee consisting of a 
chair and two (or more) other faculty members that supervise the student’s graduate study 
and dissertation.  The composition of a student’s committee may change during his or her 
tenure at the university.  The Cornell Graduate School provided us with a listing of each 
of the PhD’s the university granted during the January 1996- December 2002 period, the 
field in which the degree was granted, and the chair and other members of each student’s 
committee at the time the dissertation was approved. We were also granted access to the 
names of all of the tenure and tenure track faculty members who were present at Cornell 
anytime during the November 1995 to November 2002 period. This permitted us to 
compute the number of times that each faculty member served as chair of a student’s PhD 
committee, as minor member of a student’s PhD committee or as either a chair or a minor 
member during the period. 
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Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics.  During the period, there were a total of 
2986 PhDs granted on Cornell’s Ithaca campus whose committee chairs were Cornell 
tenured or tenure track faculty members.1  The numbers varied across broad disciplinary 
areas with 359 coming in the humanities, 687 in the social sciences, 892 in the biological 
sciences and 1048 in the physical sciences and engineering. As the first column of table 1 
indicates, the comparable numbers of tenure and tenure track faculty members present at 
Cornell anytime during the period were 309, 607, 602 and 457, respectively. 
Column 2 of the top panel of the table indicates that the mean number of PhD 
committees that each faculty member chaired during the period varied from 1.13 in the 
social sciences to 2.29 in the physical sciences.  However, as the remaining columns of 
the table indicate, these means obscure the wide variation in dissertation supervision 
responsibility across faculty members.  For example, during the period, 58.6% of 
humanities faculty members, 44.9% of biology science faculty member, 62.1% of social 
science faculty members and 36.1% of physical science and engineering faculty members 
did not chair any PhD committees. Even at a major research university a substantial 
fraction of faculty members chair no PhD committees during a 7 year period. However, 
some faculty members chair a lot; the maximum number of dissertation committees 
chaired by a faculty member varied from 12 in the biological sciences to 19 in the social 
sciences during the period. 
                                                 
1 These are the PhD committees that were chaired by Cornell tenured or tenure track faculty. At Cornell 
emeritus faculty members, as well as former faculty members who left the university within the last year, 
are allowed to continue to chair committees. Emeritus faculty and faculty members who were previously at 
Cornell also can serve as minor members on committees, as can faculty at other universities and other 
individuals who have been granted permission to play this role (e.g. senior research associates). During the 
period, there were 152 committees, which represents 4.8% of the 3138 PhDs granted in total on the Ithaca 
campus, that were chaired by individuals other than Cornell tenured or tenure track faculty members. 
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The second and third panels of the table present comparable numbers for the number 
of PhD students on whose committees each faculty member served as a minor member 
and the sum of the number of committees for which each faculty member served as a 
chair or a minor member.  The mean number of committees on which faculty members 
served as minor members during the period varied from about 2.3 in the social sciences to 
4.5 in the physical sciences.  Again there is wide variation across individual faculty 
members, with at least one biological scientist serving as a minor member for 47 PhD 
recipients during the period and 44% of social science faculty members never serving as 
minor members during the period. 
III. Inequality in PhD Student Supervision 
How unequally distributed is the supervision of PhD students across faculty members 
within each of the different subject matter areas at Cornell?  Each of the panels of table 2 
presents cumulative frequency distributions that show how (within a field) the cumulative 
distribution of faculty members varies with the cumulative distribution of the share of 
PhD committees that that percentage of faculty members chairs, serves as a minor 
member, or either chairs or serves as a minor member.  So, for example, the top 10% of 
humanities faculty members chaired 51% of all humanities PhD committees during the 
period, the top 10% of biological sciences faculty members chaired 39% of the PhD 
committees in the biological sciences, the top 10% of social sciences faculty members 
chaired 55% of the PhD committees in the social sciences and the top 10% of physical 
sciences faculty members chaired 37% of all physical sciences PhD committees in the 
physical sciences. 
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Figures 1, 2 and 3 summarize these cumulative distributions graphically for the 4 
fields for committee chairs, committee minor memberships, and total committees served 
on, respectively. Each figure summarizes the data for each of the four fields in the form 
of a Lorenz curve that ranks faculty in terms of their “productivity”.  For example, figure 
1 ranks faculty from most committees chaired to least committees chaired, and shows 
how as the cumulative percentage of faculty increase, the cumulative percentage of 
committees chaired increases.  
If all faculty members in a field shared equally in the supervision of PhD students, the 
Lorenz curve would be a 45 – degree line.2  The more convex the Lorenz curve is for a 
field, the more unequal the distribution of PhD supervision responsibilities is across 
faculty members.  If the Lorenz curve for one field is always closer to a 45- degree line 
(less convex) than the Lorenz curve for a second field, than one can unambiguously state 
that PhD student supervision responsibilities are more equally distributed in the first field 
than they are in the second.  However, if two Lorenz curves intersect, one cannot make 
any unambiguous statements about which field has the more equal distribution of PhD 
student supervisory responsibilities from the graphical display of the data. 
Each of three figures appears to tell the same story.  PhD student supervisory 
responsibilities are most equally distributed across faculty in the physical sciences and 
least equally distributed across faculty in the social sciences.  The biological sciences and 
the humanities lie between the physical and social sciences, but we cannot make any 
                                                 
2 Ehrenberg and Smith (2003), appendix 14A presents a discussion of Lorenz curves and Gini Coefficients. 
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unambiguous statements about these two fields from this graphical display of the data 
because their Lorenz curves intersect. 3 
Why might PhD supervision responsibilities be more unequally distributed in the 
social sciences than in the physical sciences?  One reason is that faculty in several social 
science fields, for example law, business and hotel administration, have heavy 
responsibility for professional degree programs and few PhD students.  However, when 
we eliminated these faculty and their PhD students from the analyses, this did not change 
our conclusion. 
A second reason is that the size of the PhD programs relative to the number of faculty 
members varies between the physical and social sciences.  As table 1 indicates, the 
number of PhD students chaired per faculty member in the physical sciences (2.29) was 
twice the number in the social sciences (1.13).  Because any faculty member has limited 
time, he may limit the number of committees he chairs.  Such constraints on student’s 
choice of chairs may be more binding in the physical sciences because of the higher PhD 
student/faculty ratio than in the social sciences. PhD students prefer to work with the best 
faculty in their fields; however, if they are constrained from doing so they will seek out 
other faculty to be their chairs. 
A third reason may be that the faculty members in the physical sciences at Cornell are 
more homogenously high academic performers than are their colleagues in the social 
sciences.  The 1995 National Research Council Survey of the quality of graduate faculty 
                                                 
3 One can, however, do so by computing the corresponding Gini coefficient for each Lorenz curve. The 
Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and a line of perfect equality (a 45% line) 
to the total area under the line of perfect equality. With a perfectly equal distribution, the Gini coefficient 
would equal zero and the higher a Gini coefficient is the more unequal a distribution is. We computed Gini 
coefficients from our data and they are reported in appendix table 1. The Gini coefficient is always lowest 
for the physical sciences and highest for the social sciences. The humanities and the biological sciences’ 
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in the arts and science and engineering fields ranked most of Cornell’s physical science 
and engineering fields, but none of its social science fields, in the top 10 in the nation.4  
Prior research has shown that within a field, programs that are higher rated tend to have 
higher average academic performance among faculty (as measured by publications, 
citations and grant receipt) and a lower dispersion of academic performance across 
faculty members.5  If faculty members are more homogeneous, in terms of their academic 
performance in a field, students will have a greater fraction of the faculty in the field to 
choose among when seeking PhD advisors. 
Finally, the difference in the inequality of PhD supervision responsibilities between 
the physical and the social sciences may reflect differences in the way research is 
conducted and graduate study is financed in the two broad fields. Physical science 
research often requires access to laboratory equipment found in individual faculty 
members’ labs and there are limitations on the number of students that a faculty member 
can incorporate into her lab team. In contrast, most empirical social science research 
involves use of publicly available data bases and statistical packages and if a faculty 
member takes on more graduate students in the social sciences, this does not reduce her 
existing students’ access to research facilities. 
Similarly, a larger fraction of PhD students in the physical sciences than in the social 
sciences are supported as research assistants on external research grants that faculty 
members receive.  A high proportion of physical science faculty members have research 
grants and support graduate students on their grants; indeed admissions committees may 
                                                                                                                                                 
coefficients lie in the middle,  with the biological sciences showing a more equal distribution than the 
humanities for chairs, but a less equal distribution for minor committee membership 
4 Goldberger, Maher and Flattau (1995) 
5 Ehrenberg and Hurst (1998) 
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tweak admissions processes to make sure that faculty with grants have students who want 
to work with them.  In contrast, a much smaller fraction of social science PhD students 
are supported as research assistants; many more are supported as teaching assistants out 
of institutional funds and their financial support is independent of their advisors.  For 
example, in the fall of 2001 44% of all doctoral students in the physical sciences at 
Cornell were supported as research assistants, but only 27% of the social science doctoral 
students were.6  Because advisors in the social sciences less often have responsibility for 
providing financial support for their students, this may allow the best social science 
faculty to take on more PhD students than the best physical science faculty. 
IV. Why Does Faculty Productivity in Supervising PhD Students Vary Across 
Faculty Members Within a Broad Field? 
In addition to being granted access to the names of the faculty members associated 
with each PhD granted by Cornell University during the 1996- 2002 period, under the 
condition that we would not make the data for any individual faculty member public, we 
also were granted access to a number of variables relating to each tenure or tenure track 
faculty member present at Cornell anytime during the November 1995 to November 2002 
period from the Cornell University faculty data base.  This permitted us to estimate 
models to explain why, within each broad field, the number of PhD committees that a 
faculty member chaired during the period, served as a minor member or served in any 
capacity (the sum of the first two measures) varied across faculty members. 
 
(1) Sijk  = a0ij + a1ij YEARSk + a2ijSEXk + a3ijTENk + a4ijNAMEk + a5ijCUEXPk +   
               a6ijCUEXP2k +a7ijOTHEXPk + a8ijASSTk + a9ijASSOCk + a10ijdk + eij 
                                                 
6 Cornell University Graduate School (2002), table E10. 
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  Equations (1) specify that the number of times during the January 1996 to 
December 2002 period (S) that faculty member k in field j served as a chair (i=c), minor 
member (i=m), or as either a chair or a minor member (i=t) of a student who was granted 
his PhD during the period are each linear functions of the number of years that the faculty 
member was at Cornell during the  period (YEARS), a dichotomous variable indicating 
the faculty member’s gender (SEX), a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
faculty member was hired at the university directly into a tenured position (TEN), a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the faculty members holds a named chair 
(NAME), the faculty member’s years of experience at Cornell as of the end of the period 
(CUEXP) and years of Cornell experience squared (CUEXP2), the number of years of 
other experience that a faculty member had after his terminal degree prior to coming to 
Cornell (OTHEXP), dichotomous variables for whether the faculty member was an 
assistant or an associate professor at the end of the period (ASST, ASSOC), a vector of 
dichotomous variables indicating the department within the broad field that the faculty 
member was from (d) and a random error term (e). 
 Estimated coefficients for each of the three equations and four fields appear in 
table 3 and we briefly summarize our findings here.7  First, YEARS varies across faculty 
members in the sample because some faculty members were hired after November 1995, 
some departed permanently before November 2002, and some were on unpaid leave 
during part of the period.  Other factors held constant, we expect that the greater the 
                                                 
7 To keep the tables manageable, we exclude the coefficients of the departmental variables. Many of them 
proved to be statistically significantly different from zero, which indicates that faculty supervisory 
responsibilities for PhD students varied across departments during the period.  Copies of more detailed 
tables that contain these coefficients are available from us on request (pmc28@cornell.edu). 
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number of years during the period that a faculty member was at Cornell, the greater the 
number of PhD students she would supervise.  We find statistically significant and 
positive relationships between all three measures of faculty productivity in the physical 
and biological sciences, smaller and less significant positive relationships for the social 
sciences and no statistically significant relationship between years at Cornell and 
graduate student supervision in the humanities.  This suggests that research supervision 
of humanists is less tied to time and place than it is in other fields. 
 SEX is included in the model to see, holding all other factors constant, if a faculty 
member’s gender influences the faculty member’s productivity in graduate student 
supervision.  SEX takes on the value of one for female faculty and zero for male faculty 
and its coefficient is never statistically significantly different from zero.  On average, 
male and female faculty at Cornell do not differ in their propensities to chair or serve as 
minor members of PhD students’ committees. 
 Of course the importance of a faculty member’s gender may depend upon the 
relative gender balance of a department’s doctoral students and its faculty members.  If 
female students prefer female mentors, when the proportion of female faculty is less than 
the proportion of female students, one might expect female faculty to supervise more 
PhD students than their male colleagues.  However, if the proportion of female faculty is 
greater than the proportion of female students, just the reverse might happen.  
 To test if this occurred, we re-estimated equation (1) for each field, multiplying 
the SEX variable by the difference between the proportion of female faculty and the 
proportion of female students.  This variable never proved to be statistically significantly 
different from zero for the biological sciences, the physical sciences, and the social 
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sciences.  Only for the number of PhD committees chaired by humanities faculty 
members did we find evidence of a statistically significant negative relationship.  Thus, 
preferences of faculty and PhD students to work with an individual of the same gender 
manifest themselves at Cornell only in the humanities. 
 Typically, faculty members whose first appointment at Cornell was with tenure 
are established scholars with extremely strong research records.  On average, one might 
expect that their research productivity is higher than those of their colleagues at 
comparable stages of their career who were promoted to tenure within the university.  
Faculty members voting on tenure decisions have much better information about other 
aspects of faculty performance (teaching, extension and service to the university and the 
profession) for internal candidates than they do for external candidates and thus will 
typically only make external tenured appointments to people who are unquestionably 
strong in research.  So the association between coming to the university directly with 
tenure and productivity in supervision of PhD students, other factors held constant, may 
tell us something about the correlation between faculty research productivity and 
productivity in PhD student supervision.  However, the estimates in table 3 never indicate 
that there is a statistically significant association between coming to the university 
directly with tenure (TEN) and productivity in PhD student supervision. Indeed, for the 
social sciences, the relationship is statistically significant and negative. 
 Perhaps a better measure of faculty research productivity that is available to us is 
whether the faculty member holds a named chair (NAME).  This is not a perfect measure 
because named chairs may be reserved for faculty in particularly narrow subject areas 
and faculty in these areas may not be the most productive in their broader field, some 
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units at the university place heavy weight on seniority in the assignment of chairs, other 
units use named chairs as an inducement to keep faculty with outside offers from other 
universities from leaving, and the ratio of named chairs to faculty lines varies widely 
across departments at Cornell.  However, our findings do indicate that, other factors held 
constant, named chairs chaired more PhD students’ committees than other faculty during 
the period in all 4 fields, with the greatest impact of having a named chair being observed 
in the physical science where, other factors held constant, having a named chair was 
associated with chairing about 1.8 more PhD student committees during the period. 
 Years of experience at Cornell (CUEXP) was entered into the model in quadratic 
form to allow for the possibility that a faculty members’ productivity in supervising PhD 
students initially increases as his experience increases, peaks as the rate of increase gets 
smaller, and ultimately begins to fall.  From equation (1) the impact of an additional year 
of Cornell experience on productivity in supervising PhD students is given by the 
expression a5 + 2a6CUEXP.  If the coefficient a5 proves to be positive and the coefficient 
a6 proves to be negative in a model, the model predicts that a faculty member’s 
productivity in supervising PhD students will first increase and then decrease as the 
faculty member’s experience at Cornell increases.  Moreover, the age at which faculty 
PhD supervisory productivity peaks (CUPEAK), is given by 
(2) CUPEAK = -a5/2a6. 
 For all four fields and all three measures of faculty productivity in supervising 
PhD students, the estimated coefficients for CUEXP are positive and those for CUEXP2 
are negative, as we hypothesized.  Faculty members’ productivity in supervising PhD 
students does vary, on average, over their careers at Cornell, first increasing, eventually 
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peaking and then decreasing. Table 4 makes use of the coefficient estimates for each 
model and equation (2) to obtain an estimate at the age at which faculty productivity 
“peaks” for each field and each measure of productivity. Focusing on the results for 
number of PhD committees chaired, the number of years of experience at Cornell at 
which faculty productivity peaks, on average, ranges from 15.3 in the biological sciences 
to 18.0 in the social sciences.  
 The number of years a faculty member spent after receiving her highest degree 
before coming to Cornell (OTHEXP), other variables held constant, is statistically 
negatively associated with the number of PhD students the faculty member supervised in 
the humanities and the biological sciences, but is unrelated to the number of students 
supervised in the physical and social sciences.  Recalling that we have already controlled 
for whether the faculty member’s first appointment at Cornell was at the tenure level, 
these results suggest that if prior experience is not captured in an initial tenured 
appointment, the faculty member is unlikely to prove to be above average in PhD student 
supervisory responsibilities. 
 The last two variables included in the model are whether the faculty member was 
an assistant (ASST) or an associate (ASSOC) professor in the last year that he was 
observed in the sample.8  Recalling that the omitted category (to avoid collinearity) is 
being a full professor and that the faculty member’s years at Cornell is already included 
in the model, being an assistant or an associate professor is likely to represent less 
research productivity.  As such, it is not surprising that being in one of these ranks is 
                                                 
8 Several faculty members in the social sciences were initially appointed as acting assistant professors 
(usually pending completion of their PhDs) and so a dichotomous variable for this status was also included 
in the social science equation. 
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associated with less PhD supervisory responsibility in all four fields, with the reduction 
being greater for assistant professors than associate professors.9 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Our findings should be considered only illustrative because they make use of data 
from a single major research university.  Nevertheless, they indicate that PhD student 
supervisory responsibilities are unequally distributed both across broad fields and within 
each broad field at the university and that substantial fractions of tenured and tenure track 
faculty fail to chair or serve as a minor member of any PhD committees during a 7 year 
period. The degree of inequality within a field varies across the fields and we offer some 
explanations for why this may be true.  
Across faculty members in a given field, productivity in supervising PhD students 
varies systematically with several measures that reflect on the research productivity of the 
faculty members; on average more productive researchers supervise the research of more 
PhD students.  Moreover, we find that the number of PhD students that a faculty member 
supervises appears to vary systematically over the faculty member’s life cycle at Cornell, 
with productivity first increasing and then decreasing with years at Cornell.  In particular, 
the number of years at Cornell at which a faculty member’s productivity in supervising 
PhD students peaks varies across fields from about 15.3 in the biological sciences to 18.0 
in the social sciences.  While one cannot say with certainty that that would continue to 
                                                 
9 The estimates reported in table 4 ignore the fact that the dependent variables can not be less than zero. 
When there is a lower bound on a dependent variable, it is more appropriate to estimate a model that takes 
account of this constraint such as a Tobit model (see Jeffrey Wooldridge (2002)). Estimated coefficients 
from the Tobit model are found in the appendix. While the interpretation of these coefficients is slightly 
different (the coefficients now reflect both the impact of a variable on the probability that an outcome is 
nonzero and its impact on the outcome given that the outcome is positive), the main the results are very 
similar to those found in table 4. The major differences are that faculty in the humanities whose first 
appointment at Cornell was with tenure now appear to be more likely to serve as chairs of PhD committees 
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occur if in response to the end of mandatory retirement faculty retire at later ages and 
thus tend to have longer careers at Cornell, this finding should cause universities to worry 
as more and more of their faculty pass the peak PhD supervision faculty age.  Finally, we 
find evidence only for the humanities that the gender balances of the PhD student and 
faculty populations influence the numbers of PhD students that male faculty members 
supervise relative to the number of students that female faculty members supervise.   
 We encourage other researchers to conduct similar analyses as ours for other 
universities.  More generally, we encourage others to study whether measures of faculty 
productivity in the supervision of PhD students can be usefully incorporated into more 
general analyses of faculty productivity and compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and female physical scientists now appear to be less likely to serve as minor members on PhD committees, 
both results holding other variables constant. 
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                                                                Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Faculty Productivity in Producing PhDs by broad field at Cornell:  
                                    January 1996 – December 2002 
 
 
Number of 
Professors 
Mean 
Number of 
PhDs 
Supervised
Standard 
Deviation 
Percentage of 
Faculty with 
Zero 
Maximum Number of 
PhDs Supervised 
Chairperson      
Humanities 309 1.162 2.061 58.6 18 
Biological Sciences 602 1.482 1.930 44.9 12 
Social Sciences 607 1.132 2.144 62.1 19 
Physical Sciences 457 2.293 2.771 36.1 17 
Minor Member      
Humanities 309 2.375 3.253 42.1 16 
Biological Sciences 602 2.857 4.349 37.2 47 
Social Sciences 607 2.282 3.829 44.0 35 
Physical Sciences 457 4.525 5.325 23.9 30 
Total      
Humanities 309 3.537 4.719 39.2 27 
Biological Sciences 602 4.339 5.542 28.1 52 
Social Sciences 607 3.414 5.379 38.7 42 
Physical Sciences 457 6.818 7.349 18.6 42 
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Figure 1 
 
Lorenz Curve for Chairpersons
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Figure 2 
 
Lorenz Curve for Minor Members
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Figure 3 
 
Lorenz Curve for Total Involvement
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Table 2 
 
Frequency Distribution 
 
a) Humanities   
Cum. % Faculty.    Cum. % Chairperson     Cum. % Minor Member    Cum. % Total 
0% 5% 2% 2%
5% 30% 23% 23%
10% 51% 41% 40%
20% 76% 66% 64%
30% 90% 81% 80%
40% 99% 91% 90%
50% 100% 96% 97%
60% 100% 100% 100%
70% 100% 100% 100%
80% 100% 100% 100%
90% 100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
b) Biological Sciences  
Cum. % fac   Cum. % chair     Cum. % minor   Cum. % total 
0% 1% 3% 2%
5% 23% 27% 23%
10% 39% 45% 39%
20% 62% 68% 60%
30% 78% 81% 75%
40% 89% 89% 85%
50% 96% 95% 92%
60% 100% 99% 97%
70% 100% 100% 99%
80% 100% 100% 100%
90% 100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100%
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c) Social Sciences   
Cum. % fac   Cum. % chair   Cum. % minor   Cum. % total 
0% 3% 3% 2%
5% 34% 31% 29%
10% 55% 48% 46%
20% 79% 70% 68%
30% 93% 84% 82%
40% 100% 92% 91%
50% 100% 97% 97%
60% 100% 100% 100%
70% 100% 100% 100%
80% 100% 100% 100%
90% 100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 
d) Physical Sciences                        
Cum. % fac   Cum. % chair    Cum. % minor   Cum. % total 
0% 2% 1% 1%
5% 22% 21% 20%
10% 37% 36% 34%
20% 57% 58% 54%
30% 73% 72% 69%
40% 85% 84% 80%
50% 94% 91% 88%
60% 98% 96% 94%
70% 100% 99% 98%
80% 100% 100% 100%
90% 100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100%
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                                                                Table 3 
 
Productivity Equationsa 
 
a) Humanities Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.100 0.77 0.011 0.18 0.089 1.00 
SEX 0.660 1.30 0.332 1.34 0.327 0.94 
TEN 1.032 1.35 0.535 1.44 0.497 0.94 
NAME 1.865 2.75 1.187 3.60 0.677 1.45 
CUEXP 0.446 4.40 0.106 2.15 0.340 4.88 
CUEXP2 -0.012 -5.02 -0.003 -2.69 -0.009 -5.40 
OTHEXP -0.144 -3.15 -0.081 -3.63 -0.063 -2.01 
ASSC -2.130 -3.12 -1.046 -3.15 -1.084 -2.31 
ASST -2.246 -2.14 -1.394 -2.73 -0.852 -1.18 
R² / n  0.355 / 309  0.200/309  .359/309  
 
 
 
b) Biological Sciences Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.355 3.17 0.141 3.42 0.215 2.38 
SEX -0.690 -1.39 -0.063 -0.35 -0.626 -1.56 
TEN -0.341 -0.47 -0.284 -1.07 -0.056 -0.10 
NAME 1.021 1.48 0.980 3.88 0.041 0.07 
CUEXP 0.213 2.51 0.051 1.65 0.162 2.36 
CUEXP2 -0.007 -3.48 -0.002 -2.36 -0.005 -3.23 
OTHEXP -0.130 -3.09 -0.034 -2.19 -0.096 -2.83 
ASSC -0.967 -1.81 -0.664 -3.39 -0.303 -0.70 
ASST -3.484 -4.00 -1.222 -3.83 -2.262 -3.22 
R² / n 0.334 / 602  0.260 / 602  0.296 / 602  
 
 
 
c) Physical Sciences Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.779 4.61 0.190 2.80 0.589 4.58 
SEX -0.722 -0.76 0.182 0.48 -0.905 -1.24 
TEN 0.434 0.43 0.040 0.10 0.395 0.51 
NAME 3.321 4.36 1.798 5.89 1.523 2.62 
CUEXP 0.343 2.96 0.160 3.45 0.183 2.08 
CUEXP2 -0.010 -4.24 -0.005 -4.88 -0.005 -2.99 
OTHEXP -0.116 -1.59 -0.037 -1.25 -0.079 -1.43 
ASSC -1.887 -2.06 -0.677 -1.85 -1.210 -1.74 
ASST -3.464 -2.59 -1.346 -2.51 -2.118 -2.08 
R² / n 0.414 / 457  0.338 / 457  0.351 / 457  
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d) Social Sciences Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.210 1.87 0.045 0.97 0.165 2.01 
SEX 0.185 0.41 0.137 0.74 0.048 0.15 
TEN -1.841 -2.83 -0.584 -2.18 -1.257 -2.64 
NAME 2.189 3.75 1.057 4.39 1.132 2.64 
CUEXP 0.234 2.79 0.082 2.38 0.152 2.47 
CUEXP2 -0.007 -3.33 -0.002 -2.82 -0.004 -2.96 
OTHEXP -0.039 -0.91 -0.017 -0.96 -0.022 -0.70 
ACTNG 0.504 0.15 -0.099 -0.07 0.604 0.24 
ASSC -1.907 -3.33 -0.821 -3.47 -1.085 -2.58 
ASST -3.422 -3.98 -1.363 -3.85 -2.059 -3.26 
R² / n 0.29 / 607  0.244 / 607  0.24 / 607  
a Also included in each equation were departmental dichotomous variables (16 for the 
humanities, 27 for the biological sciences, 15 for the physical sciences and 27 for the 
social sciences) 
 
Where: 
YEARS  Number of years between November 1995 and November 2002 the  
                                    faculty member appears in the sample 
SEX   1 if female, 0 otherwise 
TEN              1 if faculty member came to Cornell with tenure, 0 otherwise 
NAME              1 if faculty member has a named chair, 0 otherwise 
CUEXP  Number of years a faculty member has been at Cornell 
CUEXP2  Number of years a faculty member has been at Cornell squared 
OTHEXP  Number of years since faculty member received her PhD minus  
   number of years at Cornell 
ACTNG  1 if Acting Assistant Professor, 0 otherwise 
ASSC   1 if Associate Professor, 0 otherwise 
ASST   1 if Assistant Professor, 0 otherwise 
 
(Full Professor was omitted to avoid multi-collinearity)
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Table 4 
 
 
Predicted Years of Cornell University Experience at 
          Which Productivity Reaches a Peak 
 
Field Chairperson Minor Member Total 
Humanities 17.58 19.87 19.27 
Biological Sciences 15.28 16.00 15.82 
Physical Sciences 17.43 17.15 17.28 
Social Sciences 18.00 17.74 17.83 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 
 
                                        Gini Coefficients for Distribution of Cornell Faculty 
                                        PhD Student Chair, Minor Member Committee and 
                                           Total Committee Service: By Field, 1996-2002 
 
           Field     Chairs 
  Minor    
Member 
 
 Total 
Field    
Humanities 0.74      0.66 0.65 
Physical Sciences 0.60      0.58 0.54 
Biological Sciences 0.64      0.67 0.61 
Social Sciences 0.77      0.70 0.68 
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                                                     Appendix Table 2 
 
Productivity Equations: Tobit Model Coefficients 
 
a) Humanities Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.171 0.89 0.020 0.15 0.166 1.19
SEX 1.099 1.49 0.689 1.27 0.663 1.26
TEN 2.081 1.96 1.705 2.27 1.212 1.58
NAME 2.560 2.77 2.070 3.29 1.019 1.51
CUEXP 0.822 5.27 0.373 3.32 0.645 5.70
CUEXP2 -0.020 -5.80 -0.010 -3.80 -0.016 -6.13
OTHEXP -0.261 -3.76 -0.212 -3.95 -0.133 -2.68
ASSC -2.044 -2.10 -1.631 -2.36 -0.818 -1.17
ASST -3.788 -2.32 -4.762 -3.55 -1.441 -1.22
Chi2 / n 207.53 / 309 152.39 / 309 197.21 / 309 
  
b) Biological Sciences Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.685 4.73 0.326 4.64 0.522 3.94
SEX -0.541 -0.85 -0.009 -0.03 -0.753 -1.30
TEN -0.606 -0.67 -0.514 -1.19 -0.079 -0.10
NAME 1.657 1.99 1.479 3.82 0.260 0.34
CUEXP 0.416 3.74 0.160 2.90 0.340 3.35
CUEXP2 -0.011 -4.47 -0.004 -3.50 -0.009 -3.95
OTHEXP -0.129 -2.36 -0.040 -1.52 -0.108 -2.17
ASSC -0.695 -1.04 -0.731 -2.31 -0.037 -0.06
ASST -5.243 -4.43 -2.626 -4.35 -3.699 -3.38
Chi2 / n 344.56 / 602 279.15 / 602 299.20 / 602
 
c) Physical Sciences Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 1.159 6.05 0.439 4.44 0.952 6.00
SEX -1.498 -1.28 0.002 0.00 -1.891 -1.96
TEN 0.347 0.30 -0.104 -0.18 0.382 0.42
NAME 3.190 3.81 2.274 5.49 1.386 2.05
CUEXP 0.617 4.66 0.295 4.34 0.392 3.64
CUEXP2 -0.015 -5.76 -0.008 -5.68 -0.010 -4.41
OTHEXP -0.089 -1.06 -0.042 -0.98 -0.054 -0.79
ASSC -1.454 -1.43 -0.595 -1.18 -0.956 -1.16
ASST -5.275 -3.39 -2.917 -3.54 -3.619 -2.86
Chi2 / n 344.38 / 457 269.08 / 457 290.72 / 457
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d) Social Sciences Total  Chairperson  Minor Member  
 Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
YEARS 0.519 3.23 0.266 2.56 0.446 3.41
SEX 0.122 0.19 0.585 1.37 -0.004 -0.01
TEN -2.275 -2.52 -1.350 -2.36 -1.337 -1.82
NAME 2.802 3.51 2.261 4.54 1.505 2.34
CUEXP 0.577 4.68 0.271 3.32 0.405 4.07
CUEXP2 -0.015 -5.09 -0.007 -3.57 -0.010 -4.45
OTHEXP -0.031 -0.48 -0.005 -0.13 -0.037 -0.71
ASSC -2.146 -2.69 -1.449 -2.88 -1.256 -1.96
ASST -4.948 -3.92 -4.377 -4.82 -2.916 -2.88
Chi2 / n 352.97 / 607 308.00  / 607 296.37 / 607
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